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UTAH 
SUPREME COURX 
BRVE& ISSUE ALERT 
-UTAH 
,0OCUM&NT 
pOCW^™u" ^n issue raised in Caldwell v. Ford, Bacon & Davis, #20246, 
heard on the November 1987 calendar, and Lowe v. Sorenson Research 
Co,, Inc., #20395, heard on the December 1987 calendar, has also 
been raised in the following four cases all of which are scheduled 
for hearing on the March, 1988 calendar, and in one case presently 
scheduled for hearing sometime in early 1989: 
C320 020682 Utah should reexamine its position on the common 
law doctrine of employment at will, and adopt 
exceptions to termination of employment at will, 
especially if the employer has violated its own 
policy handbook in terminating an employee, or 
has otherwise terminated in bad faith. Good 
faith and fair dealing are covenants implied in 
all contracts. Larson v. Sysco. 
020673 Berube v. Fashion Centre. 
020590 Did trial court err in ruling that employment 
at-will employees had right of action against 
employer for breach of implied covenant of good 
faith and fair dealing. Brehany v. Nordstrom. 
020929 Was issue of wrongful discharge improperly 
submitted to jury where Utah does not recognize 
that claim in an employment-at-will contract. 
Hodges v. Gibson Product. 
870347 Was employee improperly terminated where 
emploher had written job policy manual and 
employee could be discharged only for "just 
cause", or was employer alternatively estopped 
from discharging employee based on employee's 
detrimental reliance on that manual? Healey v. 
D.F.G.Inc. 
870347 Was employer's retaliatory discharge of employee 
who wrote letter to Industrial Commission in aid 
of unemployed former co-worker exception to 
employment at will doctrine, and subject to 
recovery in tort, including punitive damages? 
Healey v. D.F.G. Inc. 
Caldwell and Lowe, heard in November and December, 1987, 
were both assigned to Justice Zimmerman. 
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF STATE OF UTAH 
CHARLOTTE HEALEY, : 
Priority Classification 
Plaintiff/Appellant/ : No. (if. £ 
vs. : 
DFG GOGGLES INC./ a : Civil No. 87 0347 
Utah Corporation/ 
Defendant/Respondent. : 
BRIEF OF THE APPELLANT 
Appeal from the Second Judicial District Court 
Davis County/ Judge Douglas Cornaby 
I. STATEMENT SHOWING JURISDICTION OF UTAH SUPREME COURT. 
The statutory authority granting jurisdiction to the 
Utah Supreme Court is Utah Code Annotated Section 78-2-8 
(3)(i) (1986). 
II. STATEMENT SHOWING NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS. 
This Appeal is from a Summary Judgment granted the 
Respondent in the District Court of Davis County/ State of 
Utah, on August 28/ 1987/ denying the Plaintiff/Appellant's 
claims of breach of contract and unlawful termination from 
employment. 
III. STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW. 
The Appellant raises the following issues on appeal: 
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a. Did Appellant state a claim upon which relief 
could be granted, either in contract or in tort/ by alleging 
she had been terminated in violation of express written 
company policy? 
b. Did the Appellant state a claim upon which 
relief could be granted/ either in contract or in tort/ by 
alleging that she was discharged in retaliation for a written 
statement given to the Utah State Industrial Commission in 
support of a claim for unemployment compensation benefits by 
a former employee of the company whom the Appellant had 
supervised? 
IV. DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS/ STATUTES/ AND 
ORDINANCES. 
Utah Code Annotated/ Section 35-1-16 (1)/ (4)/ (5) 
Powers and duties of commission/fees. 
Utah Code Annotated/ Section 35-4-2 
Public policy - General welfare requires creation of 
unemployment reserves - Employment offices. 
Annot./ 60 A.L.R. 3d 226/ Section 3 (1974) 
V. STATEMENT OF THE CASE. 
A. Nature of the Case. The Appellant claims exceptions 
to the Utah "at-will" employment doctrine because of written 
promises of job security from her employer and because of 
retaliation by her employer for a letter to the Utah State 
Industrial Commission in support of a claim for unemployment 
compensation by a co-worker. The District Court refused to 
recognize these exceptions and granted Summary Judgment. 
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These proceedings began when Plaintiff filed her Complaint in 
Davis County District against DFG, Inc. in October, 1985. 
Defendant subsequently filed its answer and counterclaim and 
discovery was conducted by both parties. On June 23, 1987/ 
Defendant filed a Motion for Summary Judgment which Judge 
Douglas L. Cornaby granted on August 7, 1987. Prior to the 
Summary Judgment/ the Court ordered publication of the 
following depositions: E. William Scott/ President of DFG, 
Inc.; Maria Gray, Assistant Manager/ DFG, Inc.; Reed Leavitt, 
Plant Manager, DFG, Inc.; Hai Holland, original co-
Plaintiff/ whose claim was later settled; and Charlotte Ruth 
Healey, Plaintiff (Volume I, January 10/ 1986/ and Volume II, 
January 31, 1986). 
C. Relevant Facts. Charlotte Healey was fired in 
February 1985 from employment with the Defendant DFG Goggles, 
Inc., where she had worked since May of 1977 (Deposition of 
Charlotte Healey, Volume I, pg . 3). The Defendant manu-
factures ski goggles and Charlotte worked as a supervisor in 
the lens assembly process (Deposition of William Scott, pg. 
6, and Deposition of Charlotte Healey, Volume I, pg. 5-7). 
When Mrs. Healey was hired, and other times thereafter, 
she received a written three-page policy statement from DFG 
in which DFG set forth various items of company policy. 
Among the express provisions of the written policy statement, 
the company represented that after a short probationary 
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period employees were given "job security". The written 
statement further provided that job security could be lost in 
three specific ways (none of which applied to Appellant) or 
by "discharge for just cause". (The statement is attached as 
addendum Exhibit "A"). The officers of DFG viewed this 
written policy statement as binding both upon the company and 
upon the employees. (See deposition of company president/ E. 
William Scott/ at pg. 34 - 37.) 
Appellant alleged that: 
1. Her discharge was without just cause and 
therefore in violation of the express company written policy; 
and 
2. Her discharge constituted an intentional 
infliction of emotional distress/ and 
3. Her discharge was in retaliation for a written 
statement she had sent to the Utah State Industrial Commis-
sion in support of the claim for unemployment compensation by 
a former employee (Hai Holland) of DFG/ Inc. whom Mrs. Healey 
had supervised. 
Mrs. Healey filed a Complaint in the District Court for 
Davis County alleging both breach of contract and actions in 
tort for wrongful discharge and intentional infliction of 
emotional distress. 
The Honorable Douglas Cornaby granted Summary Judgment 
in favor of DFG/ Inc. ruling that Mrs. Healey was an "at 
will" employee who had presented no claim to an exception 
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from the "at will" category which was recognized in the 
courts of Utah. Plaintiff Healey appeals from that Summary 
Judgment. 
VI. SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT. 
The Defendant employer gave express written promises 
of job security to the Plaintiff, and the employer considered 
itself and all employees bound by such written policies. 
Plaintiff was an employee and could only be terminated with 
"just cause". The provisions of the written employee policy 
manual are specific enough to allow a cause of action for 
breach of contract. Consideration for the contract is found 
in the Plaintiff's continued work for more than seven years 
in return for a package of benefits which included pay, 
vacation time, promotions and written policies of job 
security. 
"If -the initial contract cannot be found in a traditional 
sense, the alleged facts, if true, are appropriate for an 
application of the doctrine of promissory estoppel based on 
the plaintiff's detrimental reliance on the written policy 
manual. The Plaintiff alleges that she was terminated 
because of a letter she sent to the Utah Industrial Commis-
sion in aid of a fellow employee seeking unemployment 
benefits. If true, these facts support a claim for a 
retailory discharge which is a recognized exception to the 
at-will employment doctrine. The Plaintiff also stated a 
5 
cause of action for intentional infliction of severe emotion-
al distress. 
VII. ARGUMENT 
In reviewing a Summary Judgment/ the Court views the 
evidence in a light most favorable to the Appellant to 
determine that 1) no genuine issues of a material fact 
exists, and 2) the moving party was entitled to Summary 
Judgment as a matter of law. Rose vs. Allied Development 
Co., 719 P.2d 83 (Utah 1986). See also Bihlmaier vs. 
Carson, 603 P.2d 790 (Utah 1979); Norton vs. Blackham, 669 
P.2d 857 (Utah 1983); Bowen vs. Riverton City, 656 P.2d 434 
(Utah 1982). 
Although presented with factual issues regarding the 
reasons for the Plaintiff's firing (i.e. "just cause"), the 
lower Court concluded that Plaintiff presented no recognized 
exception to Utah's "at will" employment doctrine, and 
therefore had stated no recognized cause of action. Appel-
lant argues that there was sufficient evidence concerning her 
claims for breach of contract, wrongful dismissal, and 
intentional infliction of emotional distress to warrant 
submission of the claims to a jury. 
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HISTORICAL EVOLUTION OF EXCEPTIONS TO THE AT-WILL-EMPLOYMENT 
RULE 
Historical development of the at-wi11-employment 
doctrine leads back to early British law. During the 18th 
Century when England was an agricultural society, a contract 
for employment was presumed to be for one year so that an 
agricultural worker would not be out of a job when the season 
ended. When Britain suddenly changed to an industrial 
society due to the industrial revolution, the yearly hiring 
presumption became less favored and unrealistic. Employers 
were in charge of a significantly higher number of employees 
and could not reasonably guarantee them work for a years 
time. In response to the industrial needs, the courts, both 
English and American, adopted the employment-at-will doctrine 
on the premise that an employer could quit the employment 
relationship just as an employee could. 
In Adair vs. United states, 208 U.S. 161 (1908), the 
court stated: 
It cannot be, we repeat, that an employer is under 
a legal obligation against his will to retain an 
employe in his personal service any more than an 
employee can be compelled, against his will, to 
remain in the personal service of another. The 
[employee] was at liberty to quit his service 
without assigning any reason for his leaving. And 
the defendant [employer] was at liberty, in his 
discretion, to discharge [the employee] from 
service without giving any reason for so doing. 
Therefore, the Courts have, in the past, granted employers 
the right to discharge an employee for any reason, whether 
good cause, no cause, or even for cause morally wrong, when 
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absent any time l imi t for the employment. No exception was 
recognized. 
R e c e n t l y , C o u r t s have r e a l i z e d the imbalance t h i s 
i n f l e x i b l e rule has placed on the labor s i t u a t i o n , and have 
i n t e r p r e t e d the r u l e in a l e s s s t r i n g e n t manner. The 
I l l i n o i s Supreme Court in Pa lmateer v s . I n t e r n a t i o n a l 
Harvester co . , 421 N.E. 2d 876 ( 1 1 1 . 1981) was one such 
j u r i s d i c t i o n where exceptions to the at-will-employment rule 
was carved out: 
With the r i s e of l a r g e c o r p o r a t i o n s conduct ing 
s p e c i a l i z e d o p e r a t i o n s and employing r e l a t i v e l y 
immobile workers who often have no other place to 
market the ir s k i l l s , recognit ion that the employer 
and employee do not stand on equal f o o t i n g i s 
r e a l i s t i c . In addit ion, unchecked employer power, 
l i k e unchecked employee power, has been seen to 
presen t a d i s t i n c t t h r e a t to the pub l i c p o l i c y 
c a r e f u l l y considered and adopted by soc ie ty as a 
whole. As a r e s u l t , i t i s now recognized that a 
proper b a l a n c e must be m a i n t a i n e d among the 
e m p l o y e r ' s i n t e r e s t in o p e r a t i n g a b u s i n e s s 
e f f i c i e n t l y and prof i tab ly , the employee's i n t e r e s t 
in earning a l i v e l i h o o d , and s o c i e t y ' s i n t e r e s t in 
seeing i t s public p o l i c i e s carried out. 
Wagenseller v s . Scottsdale Memorial Hosp., 710 P.2d 1025 
(Arizona 1985) r e f e r s to a 1984 a r t i c l e in 40 Bus Law 1, 
which claims that "courts in t h r e e - f i f t h s of the s t a t e s have 
recogn ized some form of a cause of a c t i o n for wrongful 
discharge." 
The trend has been to allow three general exceptions to 
the employer favored r u l e . These are 1) an implied promise 
Df permanent employment, 2) the public pol icy except ion, and 
3) an implied covenant of good fa i th and fa ir dea l ing . 
8 
>OINT ONE: EXPRESS PROMISES OF JOB SECURITY WERE 
MADE TO APPELLANT BY DEFENDANT 
In analyzing whether promises were made by employers 
/hich would override their at-will prerogative, Courts have 
Looked to the following: written or verbal assurances of job 
security as long as the employee did a good job; (see Pugh 
rs. See's Candies, 116 Cal App.3d 327, 171 Cal. Rptr. 917 
[1981); personnel policies explained in an employer handbook 
>r manual, (see Toussaint vs. Blue Cross and Blue Shield of 
lichigan, 292 N.W. 2d 880 (Mich. 1980); promotions received 
>y employee (see Pugh, supra); and an employees longevity of 
service (see Pugh, supra). 
In this case, Plaintiff had received promotions (Deposi-
:ion of Charlotte Healey, Volume I, pg. 6), had worked for 
:he Defendant for 7 years, and had received a personnel 
nanual which gave a written assurance of job security. The 
written policy statement provided: 
"You have a right to fair and respectful treatment" 
paragraph 2, page 1. 
"YOUR GUARANTEE OF FAIR TREATMENT. Your work 
involves others. Sometimes you may have a problem, 
suggestion or concern. You have a right to express 
this and we want to hear about such matters." 
paragraph 3, page 1. 
"JOB SECURITY COMES WITH EXPERIENCE. New employ-
ees are probationary until they have worked 40 
shifts... During this period, the employee can be 
terminated for any reason that seems in the best 
interest of the employee, others here, or the 
Company. After 40 shifts have been worked you are 
deemed experienced from the date of hire and have 
job security. 
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Job security is lost when an employee resigns 
(preferably after reasonable notice)/ when an 
employee has been absent without notice for three 
working days/ after overstaying a leave of absence 
more than three days or after discharge for just 
cause." paragraph 6 and 1, page 1. (See Addendum 
Exhibit "A"/ for full text). 
The language in the manual "deems" tenure and permanency 
o be given once 40 shifts (usually 40 work days) are worked. 
OINT TWO: THE EMPLOYER CONSIDERED ITSELF AND ALL 
EMPLOYEES BOUND BY THE WRITTEN POLICIES. 
The Appellant in this case alleges that a binding 
greement existed between the two parties wherein the 
*fendant gave written promises of job security. Deposition 
f Charlotte Healey VII/ Pg. 83). This allegation is 
ipported by the statements of William Scott/ President of 
le Defendant corporation/ in his Deposition on pages 34 to 
7 describing a three (3) page written statement of the corn-
any' s policies. The statement was given to all employees 
id the company admits they were bound by the policies stated 
lerein. 
In the Deposition of the President/ William Scott/ (pg. 
• - 37) he was asked the following: 
Q: "Did you consider employees to be bound by the 
atements in that handout? 
A: What do you mean by bound? 
Q: Did you expect them to live up to the rules and 
gulations and statements supplied in that handout? 
A: Yes. I think so. 
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Q: Did you consider the company to be bound by that 
ndout? 
A: Yes." 
These policies, the Appellant maintains, remove the case 
om the "at-will" category of employment and impose special 
ties on the employer. The breach of these duties forms the 
sis of Plaintifffs claims in tort and contract law. 
INT THREE: PLAINTIFF HAS STATED A CAUSE OF ACTION FOR 
BREACH OF CONTRACT. 
The general rule previously applied to employment 
ntracts was that if a contract gave no specific duration 
riod, the contract was terminable at the pleasure of either 
rty and at any time. Dover Copper Mining Co. vs. Doenges, 
P.2d 288 (Ariz.1932); Daniel vs. Magma Copper co., 620 
2d 699 (Ariz. 1980); Crane Co. vs. Dahle, 576 P.2d 870 
tah 1978); Bihlmaier vs. Carson, 603 P.2d 790 (Utah 1979). 
Leikvold vs. Valley View Community Hospital, 688 P.2d 170 
riz. 1984), the Arizona Supreme Court agreed with the 
nnesota Supreme Court which stated: "if the parties choose 
provide in their employment contract of indefinite 
ration for provisions of job security, they should be able 
do so." Pine River State Bank vs. Mettille, 333 N.W. 2d 
2 (Minn. 1983). 
The Utah Supreme Court has not considered a case 
volving duties assumed in writing by an employer. Other 
urts have faced this issue. See: Mobile Coal Producing 
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Inc./ v. Parks, 704 P.2d 702 (Wyo. 1985) (each such case is 
considered on its own merits and particular circumstances.) 
See also: Annot./ 60 A.L.R. 3d 226/ Section 3 (1974); 
Wagenseller / supra; Broussard v. CACI/ Inc./ 780 F.2d 162 
(1st Cir. 1986) (written promise must be express not im-
plied) ; Thompson v. St. Regis Paper Co./ 102 Wash. 2d 219/ 
685 P.2d 1081/ 1087-88 (1984) (employees1 expectation of 
specific treatment enforceable); Wooley v. Hoffman-LaRoche, 
Inc./ 99 N.J. 284/ 481 A.2d 1257 (whether policy statement is 
enforceable is jury question of intent); Langdon v. Saga 
Corp./ 569 P.2d 524 (Okla. Ct. App. 1977). 
The Utah Supreme Court has stated: 
In deciding whether an employment contract is 
"at-will"/ the court must look at the totality 
of the circumstances surrounding employment 
and the intent of the employer and employee. 
Rose v. Allied Development Co./ 719 P.2d 83 (Utah 1986) 
Appellant believes that since Defendant made written 
statements which implied promises of job security, the 
Defendant should be held to such promises. The issue is ripe 
for the Utah Supreme Court and the factual synopsis is 
appropriate for such a ruling. 
The obvious challenge to Plaintiff's claim of contract 
is the issue of consideration. As the Court said in Rose: 
Was there consideration sufficient to prevent 
Allied's termination of plaintiff's employment at 
will? This, of course/ must be consideration in 
addition to the services already required and must 
result in a detriment to the employee and a benefit 
to the employer. ... Plaintiff contends that he 
gave such consideration because he incurred 
expenses for tuition and books/ thus suffering a 
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legal detriment* Despite this contention, however, 
Allied correctly notes that it did not accrue any 
benefit by plaintiff's attendance at school. 
Allied concedes that had it requested plaintiff to 
attend school or had plaintiff agreed to perform 
services in addition to what he was already 
required to do rather than merely continuing his 
present duties, a different result might be reached 
here. To satisfy the "good consideration: excep-
tion of Bihlmaier, plaintiff would have had to 
offer Allied, at Its request, something more than 
what he was already obligated to do under his 
employment agreement, not just a continuation of 
the duties he was required to perform. Rose v. 
Allied, 719 P.2d 83, at pg. 86 
The consideration issue was historically an impediment 
to claims of breached employment contracts. Recent cases in 
other jurisdictions have found that it is sufficient to show 
consideration on the part of the employee simply by his or 
her continuing to work in reliance on the employer's promise 
of employment tenure. See Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue 
Shield, 292 N.W.2d 880, 408 Mich. 579 (1980); and Pine River 
State Bank v. Mettille, 333 N.W. 2d 622 (Minn. 1983). 
Courts have also found a breach of contract by addres-
sing the consideration element in two ways: 
1) Traditional consideration 
Early cases applied a rule that additional con-
sideration, beyond performing the work for which an employee 
is paid, was required to make a promise of tenure enforce-
able. See Pugh, supra (discussing evolution of early cases). 
The problem with this approach is discussed in Henry H. 
Perritt's book: Employee Dismissal Law and Practice, as 
follows: 
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The doctrine of additional consideration sometimes 
has lead to the erroneous notion that a promise of 
employment tenure must be supported by its own 
consideration/ separate from consideration for 
other promises in the employment agreement. A 
majority view of contract doctrine is to the 
contrary. 
Perritt/ at pg. 139. 
Perritt also offers the following discussion as 
illustrative of the general rule of contracts: 
'A single and undivided consideration may bargained 
for and given as the agreed equivalent of one 
promise or of two promises or of many promises.' 
Thus there is no analytical reason why an em-
ployee's promise to render services over time, may 
not support an employer's promise both to pay a 
particular wage (for example) and to refrain from 
arbitrary dismissal. 
Pugh, supra at pg. 325-326 (quoting Corbin) See also: 
Weiner v. McGraw Hill/ Inc./ 57 N.Y. 2d 458/ 448 N.E. 2d 441/ 
444 (1982); Hamer v. Sidway/ 124 N.Y. 538/ 27 N.E. 256 
(1891); Restatement (Second) of Contracts/ Section 72. 
The real issue in an employment contract is whether the 
entire package of promises from the employer is supported by 
consideration/ not whether every single promise (e.g. pay/ 
benefits/ working conditions/ vacation policies/ pension 
plans/ promotions policies/ termination policies/ etc.) is 
supported by a separate consideration. 
In the real world of the work place/ an employee accepts 
a job and continues to work/ continually re-evaluating his or 
her commitment to stay/ based on the entire package offered 
by the employer and not on a sterilized view of gross pay 
alone. 
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The Defendant DFG offered its employees a complete 
package of pay, benefits and protections. The written policy 
(attached as Addendum Exhibit "A") was binding on both 
employees and employer (Deposition of William Scott, at pg. 
36 - 37) , and was relied upon by every employee who "could 
read and understand." (Deposition of Charlotte Healey, Volume 
II, page 33). The Plaintiff, Charlotte Healey, viewed the 
policy handout as a binding contract (Deposition of Charlotte 
Healey, Volume II, page 83). 
The Plaintiff's faithful work for more than seven years 
was consideration for not only a unilateral offer of pay, but 
also for the entire package of benefits of written promises 
including vacations, promotions and job security. 
In the most classic sense, the written promise of job 
security was met with adequate consideration from the 
Plaintiff, Charlotte Healey. See: Southwest Gas Corporation 
v. Ahmad, 668 P.2d 261 (Nev. 1983) (fact that employee 
remained employed after receiving handbook containing promise 
of employment tenure sufficient for consideration); Wooley v. 
Hoffman-LaRoche, Inc., supra (promise of dismissal for cause 
only contained in employee handbook raises presumption of 
reliance); Wagenseller, supra (rejecting necessity of proof 
of reliance in fact on policy manual promise); Brookshaw v. 
South St. Paul Feed, Inc., 381 N.W. 2d 33, 36 (Minn. App. 
1986) (employee accepts offer contained in handbook by 
remaining on the job). 
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2) Promissory Estoppel 
Promissory estoppel on a promise is sometimes 
viewed as a substitute for consideration. However/ viewed/ 
promissory estoppel is just a term for the legal concept that 
detrimental reliance on a promise/ even if it is not bar-
gained for/ can make a promise enforceable. See: Restate-
ment second) of Contracts/ Section 90 (1979)/ including the 
explanation in the notes to Section 90. 
This issue is addressed separately as the next point of 
argument. 
POINT FOUR: PLAINTIFF MAY RECOVER FROM DEFENDANT UNDER THE 
DOCTRINE OF PROMISSORY ESTOPPEL 
The doctrine of promissory estoppel may be applied for 
recovery where no formal contract exists/ as discussed in the 
Rose case: 
Plaintiff contends that even if this Court finds 
that even if this Court finds that there was not a 
contract that was terminable only for cause/ the 
doctrine of promissory estoppel should be invoked 
to allow him to recover for his termination from 
Allied. ... 
To allow plaintiff to recover under the doctrine of 
promissory estoppel would require more than his 
subjective understanding that the two brief 
conversations with Wetsel became a binding promise 
not to terminate him. It would further require 
finding that he was justified in assuming/ once 
again from these two conversations/ that Allied had 
promised not to terminate him at will. 
Rose v. Allied/ 719 P.2d 83/ at pg. 87. 
The Plaintiff in Rose failed because his claims of a 
promise implied from conversations with his employer were too 
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subjective, and because he lacked justification for reliance 
on the conversations. 
The Plaintiff, Charlotte Healey, presents a much more 
substantial claim. 
First/ the promises are written/ not oral, and express/ 
not implied. The Court can analyze them and determine their 
objective meaning/ and resort to speculation about intent is 
unnecessary. The clear objective meaning of the written 
promises requires just cause for termination. 
Second/ reliance on these written promises was jus-
tified. The company President/ William Scott/ testified in 
his deposition that the company and the employees were bound 
by the written policies (Deposition of William Scott at pg. 
36 - 37/ quoted at POINT THREE/ supra). The written policies 
have been given to new employees for years/ and they were 
expected to follow them. Reliance on these express written 
promises/ was not only reasonable/ it was mandatory. 
The Plaintiff/ Charlotte Healey; has alleged reliance on 
the written job security promises. She said that they were 
relied upon by every employee who "could read and under-
stand." (Deposition of Charlotte Healey, Volume 11/ page 33). 
Charlotte viewed the written policies to be a binding 
contract. (Deposition of Charlotte, Volume 11/ Page 83). 
If true/ these statements present a claim of promissory 
estoppel as articulated by the court in Rose, quoted above. 
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See also: Petty v. Gindy Mfg. Corp./ 404 P.2d 30, 
17 Utah 29 32 (1965); 387 P.2d 1000, 15 Utah 2d 101 (1964) 
(along Restatement of Contracts); Restatement (Second) of 
contracts Section 90. 
The Plaintiff Charlotte Healey, presented evidence 
which, when viewed in a light most favorable to her claim, 
would support an application of the doctrine of promissory 
estoppel. The issue should proceed to a trial of the facts. 
POINT FIVE: PUBLIC POLICY REQUIRES THAT THE UTAH IN-
DUSTRIAL COMMISSION HAVE BROAD INVESTIGATIVE 
POWERS. 
The Utah State Industrial Commission is given charge of 
the administration of the Utah Employment Security Act. (Utah 
Code Annotated Section 35-4-11). Utah Code Annotated section 
35-1-16 lists other duties of the Industrial Commission and 
states in part that the Industrial Commission is to: 
(1) To supervise every employment and place of 
employment and to administer and enforce all 
laws for the protection of the life, health, 
safety and welfare of employees. 
(4) To investigate, ascertain, and determine such 
reasonable classifications of persons, 
employments and places of employment as shall 
be necessary to carry out the purposes of this 
title. 
(5) To promote the voluntary arbitration, media-
tion and conciliation of disputes between 
employers and employees. 
Chapter 4 of Title 35 in Utah Code Annotated is the 
Employment Security Act relating to unemployment compensa-
tion. Utah Code Annotated section 35-4-2, states: 
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Public policy -General welfare requires creation of 
unemployment reserves - Employment office. 
As a guide to the interpretation and application of 
this act/ the public policy of this state is 
declared to be as follows: Economic insecurity due 
to unemployment is a serious menace to the health/ 
morals, and welfare of the people of this state. 
Unemployment is therefore a subject of general 
interest and concern which requires appropriate 
action by the legislature to prevent its spread and 
to lighten its burden which now so often falls with 
crushing force upon the unemployed worker and his 
family. The achievement of social security 
requires protection against this greatest hazard of 
our economic life. ... 
To fulfill Plaintiff's statutory purposes, the Industrial 
Commission must have broad investigative powers. If employ-
ees feared losing their jobs after complaining or providing 
valued information to the Industrial Commission regarding 
their employers/ fewer employment disputes would arise to the 
attention of the Commission and the system would be greatly 
frustrated. Who better than an employee can describe a 
working environment? The Industrial Commission's hearing 
process must be safely kept an open forum in order to secure 
the welfare of the people of this state/ and to protect 
"against this greatest hazard of our economic life" (i.e. 
unemployment hazards). Utah Code Annotated Section 35-4-2. 
POINT SIX: THE PLAINTIFF'S LETTER TO THE INDUSTRIAL 
COMMISSION WAS A CAUSE FOR PLAINTIFF'S 
TERMINATION 
Plaintiff alleges that the reason for her termination 
was retaliation for her submission of a letter to the 
Division of Employment Security to aid a former employee of 
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Defendant who was seeking unemployment compensation. 
(Deposition of Charlotte Healey, Volume II, Pg. 28) The 
President of DFG, Inc., William Scott, agreed with this in 
his Deposition of January 8, 1986. When asked" "Did that 
letter have anything to do with Charlotte's termination?", he 
said "Yes". (Pg. 31-32) 
Plaintiff had been asked by the former employee to 
appear at the hearing regarding her unemployment; however, 
Appellant could not agree to this because she feared she 
would lose her job. (See Deposition of Hai Holland, pg. 71-
72). The Plaintiff instead, wrote a letter to help the 
former employee. The letter which Appellant submitted to the 
Industrial Commission in defense of a co-worker was the 
determining factor or "final straw" which lead to Appellant's 
termination. (Deposition of William Scott, pg. 32). There 
can be no other conclusion than the termination was based on 
retaliation, but the matter should be decided in a trial of 
the issues. 
POINT SEVEN: UTAH SHOULD RECOGNIZE THE PUBLIC POLICY 
EXCEPTION TO THE "AT-WILL" EMPLOYMENT DOCTRINE 
IN PLAINTIFF'S CASE 
Plaintiff has presented substantial evidence that she 
was fired in retaliation for her letter to the Industrial 
Commission. Utah Courts should recognize the public policy 
exception to the "at-will" employment doctrine. Other 
Courts, such as the Oregon Appeals Court stated: 
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Termination for pursuing a statutory right directly 
related to the individual's role as employee is an 
exception to the at will doctrine, 
Patton v. J.C. Penny Co. Inc., 707 P.2d 1256, 75 Or. 
App. 638 (1985). See also Cain v. Kansas Corp. Com'n., 673 
P.2d 451, (Kan. 1983), allowing tort of retaliatory discharge 
where termination violates public policy. 
As discussed in the historical evolution context above, 
when an employee's termination goes against a public policy, 
the Courts have justification for allowing an exception to 
the at-will employment doctrine. 
One of the earliest cases making such an exception for 
an offense to public policy was Petermann vs. International 
Brotherhood of Teamster, 344 P.2d 25, 174 Cal. App. 2d 184 
(1959). In this case an employee refused to commit perjury 
for his employer and was subsequently fired. When the 
employee sued, the trial court ruled in favor of employer 
under the at-will doctrine. The Court of Appeals reversed 
and ruled that an employer's right to terminate is limited by 
considerations of public good or public policy. Many states 
have faced this problem and most have held that an action is 
available to an employee whose termination violates public 
policy and is deemed either a breach of contract or a tort. 
(See Nees v. Hocks, 536 P.2d 515 (Ore. 1975) and Wagenseller, 
supra). 
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POINT EIGHT: "JUST CAUSE" IS A FACTUAL ISSUE TO BE DETER-
MINED BY THE TRIER OF FACT 
Whatever the reasons for the Plaintifffs termination. 
Plaintiff disputes that the Defendant had a just cause for 
her termination. Also, the Utah Supreme Court stated: 
An employer does not have an absolute right to 
discharge employees, and is limited by legislative 
and judicial exceptions to the "at-will" doctrine. 
Rose, supra. 
The Washing Appeals Court stated: 
A Contract for employment terminable at will may 
nonetheless, be terminated only for just cause if 
there is an implied agreement for permanent or 
steady employment. 
Goodpasture v. Pfizer, Inc., 665 P.2d 414, 35 Wash. App. 
199 (1983). 
The Defendant's exhaustive arguments in its Motion for 
Summary Judgment that just cause existed for Appellant's 
termination only illustrate the truth that "just cause" is a 
factual issue. See Harp v. Administrator, Bureau of Un-
employment Compensation, 230 N.E. 2d 376, 12 Ohio Misc. 34 
(1967). 
POINT NINE: APPELLANT STATED A CLAIM FOR INTENTIONAL 
INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS 
Plaintiff's Complaint stated a cause of action for her 
emotional distress arising from the intentional termination. 
This allegation was based on Defendant's having provided all 
employees with a personnel manual which gave written promises 
of job security. Appellant relied on these promises and was 
subsequently fired contrary to the personnel manual. Also, 
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retaliation for Plaintiff's letter to the Utah Industrial 
Commission might give rise to the same cause of action. 
Plaintiff alleges that her emotional distress following 
her termination was so severe that she sought help from a 
physician. (Deposition of Charlotte Healey, Volume II, Pg. 
93) 
In the Utah case of Samms v. Eccles, 358 P.2d 344, 11 
Utah 2d 289 (1961), the elements of the tort of intentional 
infliction of emotional distress were clearly defined. A 
prima facie case of intentional infliction of emotional 
distress is established when: 1) the Defendant's conduct is 
outrageous, 2) it is intended to cause emotional distress, 3) 
severe emotional distress results, and 4) a causal connection 
exists between the Defendant's improper conduct and Plain-
tiff's distress. 
Plaintiff claims that Defendant's conduct was outrageous 
since the manual was distributed to all employees for the 
purposes of defining "formal company policies" (Deposition of 
William Scott, pg. 34), and when Plaintiff was fired without 
just cause and in retaliation for providing information to 
the Industrial Commission, such termination was inconsistent 
with the formal company policies. Plaintiff also claims that 
Defendant's acts were committed with full knowledge and with 
the intent of depriving Plaintiff of her employment security 
and to punish her for her "whistle-blowing." Appellant does 
not feel she was terminated for a just cause and has suffered 
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emotional distress and humiliation as a result of Defendant's 
conduct. 
The circumstances surrounding this issue are factual 
questions which should have been decided by a jury. 
POINT TEN: WHILE APPELLANT MAY NOT RECOVER PUNITIVE 
DAMAGES FOR BREACH OF CONTRACT, APPELLANT 
SHOULD BE ALLOWED TO RECOVER SUCH DAMAGES IN 
TORT 
As previously cited in Cain v. Kansas Corp. Comfn., an 
action in tort for retaliatory discharge may lie where the 
termination violates public policy. In the present case, the 
actions of the Defendant in its breach of contract are also 
the same acts that constitute the tort of retaliatory 
discharge and intentional infliction of emotional distress. 
Thus, while the Plaintiff may not recover for the emotional 
or punitive damages under a contract theory, the Plaintiff 
may be allowed to recover punitive and emotional damages in 
tort. In a most recent statement, Beck v. Farmers Ins. 
Exchange, 701 P.2d 785 (Utah 1985), the Court refused to find 
a tort of bad faith breach of an insurance contract, in a 
first part context, but noted that: 
We recognize that in some cases the acts consti-
tuting a breach of contract may also result in 
breaches of duty that are independent of the 
contract and may give rise to causes of action in 
tort. 
See also: Hal Taylor Assoc, v. Union America, 657 P.2d 
743, 750 (1983). 
The duties of the Defendant D.F.G. were voluntarily 
assumed and relied upon. The Appellant asserts that these 
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duties may form the basis of an intentional tort action with 
an award of punitive damages. 
Punitive damages may also be awarded upon proof of an 
intentional infliction of emotional distress. 
"Vttt CONCLUSION 
The Plaintiff has alleged the facts which/ if true, 
would support a cause of action for breach of contract or for 
the application of the doctrine of promissory estoppel. 
Plaintiff also presented facts which/ if true, would support 
a separate action in tort including an action for intentional 
infliction of emotional distress. Punitive damages may be 
awarded on the non-contractual claims if proven. Utah law 
does recognize exceptions to the at-will employment doctrine/ 
and the case should proceed to a trial of the facts to 
determine finally whether the Plaintiff can sustain her 
burden of proof that she is not an "at-will" employee. 
Appellant respectfully prays that the Summary Judgment 
be reversed and this case remanded back to the Second 
Judicial District Court for a trial on the merits of the 
case. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this / * ^ day of February, 
1988. 
HELGESEN & WATERFALL 
JACK C.1 HEM5ESEN 
Attorney fcjr Appellant 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
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I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLANT, to Erik Strindberg, 
Price, Yeates & Geldzahler, 175 East Fourth South, Salt Lake 
City, Utah, 84111, postage prepaid this / 1 *p day of Fe-
bruary, 1988. 
2b 
ADDENDUM 
Exhibit "A" - Three page Policy Manual of Defendant DFG 
For About your work at D .F .G . 
We at D .F .G . are glad to have you working with u s . People at D . F . G . make 
a special ski and sport google which was designed by Bob Smith, called the 
Smith Goggle. Our goggles are sold in a very competitive market to consumers 
who carefully choose the product they prefer. The good design advantage is 
lost If we do not put QUALITY In every p iece . You c^n take pride in your work 
If it produces a top quality product. 
You have a right to fair and respectful treatment. You a lso have a respons ib i l -
ity to give that same fairness and respect to everyone e l se here and to do ypur 
part to see that operations run smoothly and efficiently. 
Your job will be satisfying to you if you bring a good and cheerful at t i tude to 
work and encourage others to do the same. Show your wil l ingness to do your 
full part. YOU benefit most if you try to Increase good wil l , good sp i r i t s , 
efficiency and self-development while on your job. 
YOUR GUARANTEE OF FAIR TREATMENT 
Your work involves o thers . Sometimes you may have a problem, suggestion 
or concern. You have a right to express this and we want to hear about such 
matters . Please feel welcome to talk about It with anyone in management or 
with Bob Smith. You are welcome to call us at home if it is important. 
NO DISCRIMINATION 
There should be no discrimination in any way prohibited by law against any 
person because of r ace , color, creed, s ex , national origin or a g e . Every 
person here should have equal opportunity for employment, advancement or 
ass ignment , based upon merit. 
JOB SECURITY COMES WITH EXPERIENCE 
New employees are probationary until they have worked40 shi f t s . The new 
employee should use this time to be sure they fit the Job and the v*ork and 
are compatible with others working at D . F . G . During this period, the em-
ployee can be terminated for any reason that seems in the bes t interest of the 
employee, others here , or the Company. After 40 shifts have been worked 
you are deemed experienced from the date of hire and have Job securi ty . 
Job security is lost when an employee resigns (preferably after reasonable 
not ice) , when an employee has been absent without notice for three working 
days , after overstaying a leave of absence more than three days or after d i s -
charge for just cau^e . 
^ any case where a layoff is required, or on call back after layoff, or lor 
romotional opportunity, employees with the most experience in the c l a ^ i f i -
ation of work needed will be given preference provided skil ls and abi l i t ies 
re relatively equal . In any case where skil ls or abi l i t ies are reasonably 
uperior the superior ski l ls shall be given preference. 
WORK WEEK AND OVERTIME 
/ork is usually scheduled Monday through Friday. When schedules are 
hanged you should be given advance notice when this is possible bo you 
/ill be able to plan your off-the-Job hours . There is a 15 minute relief 
eriod near the middle of each half shift and one half hour off work is s c h e -
uled for lunch. 
)vertime pay of one and one half times the regular rate is paid tor all hours 
worked in excess of 40 in our seven day payroll week which begins on Saturday 
though no Saturday work is usually done) and ends on the following Friday 
tight. 
HOLIDAYS 
\iter 40 shifts have been worked, employees are paid a day of pay for each 
)f the following holidays when they occui or are observed on a woik day. 
Christmas, New Year's Day, Memorial Day, 4th of July, j j iy 24th, Labor 
Day and Thanksgiving Day. To be eligible tor such pay# the employee must 
<vork the day scheduled for work before and after the holiday, or be expressly 
Bxcused from such work by the management for good c a u s e . 
Also, the day af ter Thanksgiving Day. 
VACATIONS 
After one full year of service has been completed an employee Is eligible for 
one week of vacation time off with forty hours pay. After three year:, of serv-
ice , an employee is eligible for two weeks of vacation time off with eighty 
hours pay. Pay for vacations shal l be the regular rate paid, or the average of 
piece rate earnings for the full month prior to the vacat ion. Time off for vaca-
tions must be arranged in advance at times convenient for the employee and 
the company. 
MEDICAL INSURANCE 
A medical hospi tal insurance program is offered to all employees. Benefits 
can cover dependents a l s o . D . F . G , pays half the cost of this program for 
any employee who wants the coverage. Employees pay for any dependent 
cove*age des i red . 
DISCIPLINE SUSPENSION OR DISCHARGE 
We hope there will be no need for d i sc ip l ine , but extra protection is assured 
for you if you should be discipl ined, discharged or suspended. It is as un-
pleasant to hand out discipl ine as it is to be discipl ined. Self-discipl ine 
avoids all these problems. Failing in that , other discipl ine can help us get 
ourselves back on the right t rack. 
Any disc ip l ine , suspension or dismissal is deemed final and accepted by all 
concerned unless the person disciplined asks for a review of it within two 
working days afterwards. Anyone making such a request will be given a full 
hearlna with someone not involved in the d isc ip l ine . Anyone can ask and re -
ceive ntup irom any other employee or supervisor with such hearing If needed. 
Ii the employee is not satisfied with the decision after this hearing, the Com-
pany will have the matter reviewed by someone outside the Company who will 
confirm it or recommend a different result. 
SICK LEAVE PROTECTION 
D . F . G . tries to protect some of your Income when you must be absent from 
work because of i l lness or acc ident . We firmly believe that those who go to 
the trouble and expense of coming to work should be paid more than anyone 
not working. 
Employees are credited with four (4) hours of pay protection after each full 
month of service until a maximum of 96 hours of such protection has been 
accumulated. 
When required to be off work because of i l lness or injury an en ployee can 
then receive five (5) hours pay from any such credits for each wor> d<jy such 
absence Is necess i ta ted beginning with the first workday hospital ized or the 
third workday of non-hospi tal ized absence . 
Any amount paid under Workmen's Compensation or other progtama will be 
deducted from this pay for i l lness or accident . Any accumulation of credit 
will only be reduced by the amounts actually paid out to you and when you 
return to work, you again begin to earn credits for this protection. Proof 
that i l lness or accident necess i ta ted absence can be required and this can 
include a statement from a doctor who treated or examined you. No payments 
are made for any i l lness during vacat ion, layoffs, or any other kind of a b -
s e n c e . 
FUNERAL LEAVE 
You may have three days off work if necessary to attend the funeral or to 
make funeral arrangements in the event of the death of a spouse , child, 
lM\\»- . ?.r*t>or (including steo-cMlri or r<*"*n\s). If sick loavo w ^ i-, !,,<> 
available these may be used at the rate of 5 hours per dey lor funeral leave. 
